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‘It was the best of times, it was the
worst of times…’ Charles Dickens’
opening line of A Tale of Two Cities
feels strangely appropriate for the
economics profession right now. Widely
criticised in the media for apparent
failures to foresee the financial crisis,
economists nevertheless have rarely
been busier as sources of research-based
advice for policy-makers. The
researchers at the Centre for Economic
Performance (CEP) are as involved as
any, and this CentrePiece showcases a
selection of the latest work.
Our cover story – ‘The doomsday
cycle’ – focuses on the pressing question
of financial regulation. CEP researcher
Peter Boone and his US-based colleague
Simon Johnson (former chief economist
at the International Monetary Fund) call
for much more radical reform than is
currently being considered. ‘We must
stop sending the message to bankers
that they can win on the rise and also
survive the downside’, they argue.
Boone and Johnson’s blog, The
Baseline Scenario, has been highly
influential in discussions of the global
crisis. Boone is also a member of the
LSE’s Future of Finance Group,
convened by CEP’s founder director
Richard Layard and Paul Woolley of the
Centre for the Study of Capital Market
Dysfunctionality. The group will be
presenting its findings at a major
conference in July on ‘The future of
finance – and the economic theory that
underpins it’.
Layard is also contributing to policy
responses to the recession. Noting the
evidence on the human cost of past
recessions – people being permanently
‘scarred’ by a period out of work – he
and Paul Gregg have called for a ‘job
guarantee’ to prevent long-term
unemployment worsening after the
recession ends. As their article here
indicates, the government is acting to
help unemployed young people, but
more could be done.
CEP’s work is not limited to the
study of money and jobs. Radha
Iyengar, for example, sheds light on the
potential impact of the Chilcot inquiry
on military success in Iraq. CEP's
techniques for analysing management
practices are being applied to issues of
energy efficiency (Ralf Martin) and
hospital management (John Van
Reenen). And as a member of the
National Equality Panel, CEP’s research
director Stephen Machin has been
deeply involved in public debate about
UK inequality.
The UK general election, due by the
spring, will be a battleground for these
and many other issues. CEP intends to
play a role in the debate by publishing
a new series of Election Analyses,
looking at the research evidence in
some of the key policy areas. For more
information on this project and much
more on CEP’s research, visit our
website: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
Romesh Vaitilingam
Editor
romesh@vaitilingam.com
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O
ver the last three
decades, the US financial
system has tripled in size,
as measured by total
credit relative to GDP 
(see Figure 1). Each time the system runs
into problems, the Federal Reserve quickly
lowers interest rates to revive it. These
crises appear to be getting worse and
worse – and their impact is increasingly
global. Not only are interest rates near
zero around the world, but many
countries are on fiscal trajectories that
require major changes to avoid eventual
financial collapse.
What will happen when the next
shock hits? We believe we may be 
nearing the stage where the answer will
be – just as it was in the Great Depression
– a calamitous global collapse. The root
Over the last 30 years, we have built a financial
system that threatens to topple our global
economic order unless decisive measures are
taken. That is the contention of Peter Boone and
Simon Johnson, who describe a ‘doomsday cycle’
that could lead to economic disaster after the
next financial crisis.
The doomsday cycle
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Figure 1:
Private sector credit/GDP just keeps growing, while 
the Fed funds target rate is now near to zero
Source: Bloomberg, US Department of Commerce
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problem is that we have let a ‘doomsday
cycle’ infiltrate our economic system (see
Figure 2).1
The doomsday cycle has several simple
stages. At the start, creditors and
depositors provide banks with cheap
funding in the expectation that if things
go very wrong, our central banks and
fiscal authorities will bail them out. Banks
such as Lehman Brothers – and many
others in this past cycle – use the funds to
take large risks, with the aim of providing
dividends and bonuses to shareholders
and management.
Through direct subsidies (such as
deposit insurance) and indirect support
(such as central bank bailouts), we
encourage our banking system to ignore
large, socially harmful ‘tail risks’ – those
risks where there is a small chance of
calamitous collapse. As far as banks are
concerned, they can walk away and let
the state clean it up. Some bankers and
policy-makers even do well during the
collapse that they helped to create. 
Regulators are supposed to prevent
this dangerous risk-taking. Adair Turner,
chairman of the Financial Services
Authority, is calling for more radical
change than most regulators. But banks
wield substantial political and financial
power, and the system has become
remarkably complex, so eventually
regulators become compromised.
The extent of regulatory failure ahead
of the current crisis was mind-boggling.
Many banks, including Northern Rock,
convinced regulators that they could hold
just 2% of capital against large and risky
asset portfolios. The whole banking
system built up many trillions of dollars in
exposures to derivatives. This meant that
when one large bank failed, it could bring
down the whole system. 
Given the inability of our political and
social systems to handle the hardship that
would follow economic collapse, we rely
on our central banks to cut interest rates
and direct credits to bail out the loss-
makers. While the faces tend to change,
each central bank and government
operates similarly. This time, it was Mervyn
King, Gordon Brown, Tim Geithner and
Ben Bernanke who oversaw policy as the
bubble was inflating – and are now
designing our rescue.
When the bailout is done, we start all
over again. This has been the pattern in
many developed countries since the mid-
1970s – a date that coincides with
significant macroeconomic and regulatory
1 Andrew Haldane, executive director for financial stability at the Bank of England,
has written an excellent paper describing a similar idea – the ‘doom loop’ 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech409.pdf).
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Figure 2:
The doomsday cycle
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Stopping the
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requires major
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across the G-20
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change, including the end of the Bretton
Woods fixed exchange rate systems,
reduced capital controls in rich countries
and the beginning of 20 years of
regulatory easing.
The real danger is that as this cycle
continues, the scale of the problem is
getting bigger. If each cycle requires
greater and greater public intervention, 
we will surely eventually collapse.
Stopping the doomsday cycle
To stop the doomsday cycle, we need far
greater reform than is currently under
discussion. The headline-grabbing actions
of Gordon Brown and Alistair Darling,
calling for financial transactions taxes and
a one-year super tax on bonuses, have no
impact on the fundamental problems in
our system. Indeed, they are potentially
harmful to the extent that they mislead
taxpayers who want real solutions.
We need quite different and much
more focused policies. These policies must
be implemented across the G-20, with
international coordination and monitoring.
Otherwise, financial services will move to
the least regulated parts of the world, and
it will be much more difficult for each
country to maintain a tough stance.
The best route to
creating a safer
financial system is 
to have very large 
and robust capital
requirements
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Tackling regulatory failure
So what should be done? First, consider
the regulatory problem: there are two
broad ways to view past regulatory failure
that has helped us arrive at this dangerous
point. One is to argue it is a mistake that
can be corrected through better rules.
That has been the path of successive
Basel committees, which are now
designing comprehensive new rules to
ensure greater liquidity at banks and to
close past loopholes that permitted banks
to reduce their core capital. We both
worked for many years in formerly
communist countries, and this project
reminds us of central planners’ attempts
to rescue their systems with additional
regulations until it became all too
apparent that collapse was imminent. 
In our view, the long-term failure of
regulation to check financial collapses
reflects deep political difficulties in
creating regulation. The banks have the
money, they have the best lawyers and
they have the funds to finance the political
system. Politicians rarely want strong
regulators – except after a major collapse.
So politics rarely favours regulation.
There are also big operational
problems: how should regulators decide
the risk capital that should be allocated to
new and arcane derivatives, which banks
claim will reduce risk? When faced with
rooms full of papers describing new
instruments, and their risk assessments,
regulators will always be at a disadvantage
compared with banks.
The operational difficulties are further
complicated by the intellectual
undercurrents: when the economy is
booming, driven by more leveraged bets,
there is a tendency for the academic world
to provide theories that justify status quo
policies. This is clear from the growth of
efficient markets theories, which infiltrated
regulators’ decision-making during the
boom ahead of this crisis.
No wonder that Tim Geithner, while
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, or Alan Greenspan and Ben
Bernanke, as Fed chairman, did little to
arrest the rapid growth of derivatives and
off-balance sheet assets.
It requires a strong leap of faith to
believe that our regulatory system will
never again be captured or corrupted. The
fact that it has spectacularly failed to limit
costly risk should be no surprise. In our
view, the new regulations discussed in
Basel 3 will fail, just as Basel 1 and Basel 2
have failed.
The proposals sound smart because
they are correcting egregious errors of the
past. But new errors will surface over the
next five to ten years, and these will be
precisely where loopholes remain, and
where the system gradually becomes
corrupted, again.
We believe that the best route to
creating a safer system is to have very
large and robust capital requirements,
which are legislated and difficult to
circumvent or revise. If we triple core
capital at major banks to 15-25% of
assets, and err on the side of requiring too
much capital for derivatives and other
complicated financial structures, we will
create a much safer system with less scope
for ‘gaming’ the rules.
Once shareholders have a serious
amount of funds at risk, relative to the
winnings they would make from
gambling, they will be less likely to
gamble. This will make the job of
regulators far easier, and make it 
more likely our current regulatory system
could work.
Changing incentives
Second, we need to make the individuals
who are part of any failed system expect
large losses when their gambles fail and
public money is required to bail out the
system. While many executives at bailed-
out institutions lost large amounts of
money, they remain very wealthy.
Some people have clearly become
winners from the crisis. Alistair Darling
supported the appointment of Win
Bischoff, a top executive at Citigroup in
the run-up to its spectacular failure, to be
chairman of Lloyds. Vikram Pandit sold his
hedge fund to Citigroup, who then wrote
off most of the cost as a loss, but Pandit
was soon named their CEO.
Jamie Dimon and Lloyd Blankfein,
CEOs at JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs
respectively, are outright winners from this
process, despite the fact that each of their
banks also received federal bailouts.
Goldman Sachs was lucky to gain access
to the Fed’s ‘discount window’, so
averting potential collapse.
We must stop sending the message to
our bankers that they can win on the rise
and also survive the downside. This
requires legislation that recoups past
earnings and bonuses from employees of
banks that require bailouts.
The role of policy-makers
Third, we need our leading fiscal and
monetary policy-makers to admit their role
in generating this doomsday cycle through
successive bailouts. They need to develop
solutions so that their institutions can
credibly stop this cycle. The problem is
simple: most financial institutions today
have now proven too big to fail, as our
policy-makers have bailed them all out.
The rules need to change so that creditors
do not expect another bailout when the
next crisis happens.
There is some encouraging progress
with plans for ‘living wills’ and measures
to reduce the interdependency of financial
institutions. But the litmus test for this will
be when our leading policy-makers start
calling for the break-up of large financial
institutions and permanent crude limits on
their size relative to the economy in the
future.
Smaller institutions are naturally easier
It is hard to
believe that
regulatory
reform will
succeed this
time, when 
it has failed so
enormously –
and repeatedly
– in the past
to let fail, and this will make creditors
nervous when lending to them, so we can
have more confidence that creditors will
not lend to highly risky small institutions.
There are feasible ways of doing this: for
example, we could impose rising capital
requirements on large institutions over the
next five years, thus encouraging them to
develop orderly plans to break up and
shrink their banks. 
Prospects for effective
reform
So where are we going with our current
reforms? It is now obvious that risk-taking
at banks will soon be larger than ever.
Central banks and governments around
the world have proved (once again) that
they are willing to bail out banks at
enormous public cost when things go
wrong. Markets are now again providing
very cheap loans to banks, with the
comfort that the state will bail them out.
Today, Bank of America and the Royal
Bank of Scotland are each priced to have
just 0.5% annual risk of default above
their sovereigns during the next five years
in credit markets. This is a remarkably low
implied risk considering that both banks
were near to collapse just a few months
ago. Creditors are clearly very confident
that they will be bailed out again if
necessary. Indeed, they are more
comfortable lending to large risky banks
than to many successful corporations.
There is no doubt that the regulatory
environment is going to be tougher for
the next few years. But nothing has
changed to make us believe the regulatory
system will succeed this time, when it has
failed so enormously – and repeatedly – in
the recent past. To bring about the
dramatic change that is needed also
requires international cooperation and
consistency.
Many of our current policy-makers –
Ben Bernanke, Mervyn King, Alistair
Darling and Gordon Brown – are the same
ones that inflated the last bubble. So we
know with great confidence that they are
the types that will bail us out each time
things go wrong. They are all currently on
course for seeding our next rise and
collapse: cheap rates and credit, with large
moral hazard, are the initial stages of each
cycle. Very few of these people, apart
from Mervyn King, appear prepared to
recognise their past role in creating our
current problems and then to discuss
resolutely how to change it. 
The danger this system poses is clear,
as Figure 1 shows. With our financial
system now well-oiled to take on very
large risk once again, and to gamble
excessively, can we be sure that we can
continue this cycle of bailing out eventual
failures? At what point will the costs be so
large that both fiscal and monetary
policies are simply incapable of stopping
the collapse?
Last year, we came remarkably close to
collapse. Next time, it may be worse. The
threat of the doomsday cycle remains
strong and growing.
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Peter Boone is a research associate in CEP’s
globalisation programme and chairman of
Effective Intervention (http://www.effint.org),
a charity based in Britain. He is also a
principal at Salute Capital Management.
Simon Johnson is a professor at MIT's Sloan
School of Management, a senior fellow at the
Peterson Institute for International
Economics and a member of the
Congressional Budget Office's Panel of
Economic Advisers.
They are co-founders of The Baseline
Scenario, a leading economics blog
(http://baselinescenario.com), and co-authors
of ‘Our Next Financial Crisis’, published in
The New Republic in September 2009
(http://www.tnr.com/article/economy/
the-next-financial-crisis).
The failure of
regulation to
check financial
collapses
reflects deep
political and
operational
difficulties in
creating
regulation
The rules need
to change so 
that creditors do
not expect
another bailout
when the next
crisis happens
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Economic inequality 
in the UK
The independent National Equality Panel was set
up to examine how inequalities in people’s
economic outcomes – such as earnings, incomes and
wealth – are related to their characteristics and
circumstances – such as gender, age or ethnicity.
CEP’s research director Stephen Machin, one of
the panel members, summarises its report.
in brief...
Inequalities in earnings and incomes are high in the UK,
both compared with other industrialised countries, and
compared with 30 years ago. That is the central finding of
An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK. Over the
most recent decade, earnings inequality has narrowed a
little and income inequality has stabilised on some
measures, but the large inequality growth of the 1980s,
where all parts of the distribution significantly widened,
has not been reversed.
The report finds that some of the widest gaps in
outcomes between social groups have narrowed in the
last decade, particularly between the earnings of women
and men, and in the educational qualifications of different
ethnic groups. But deep-seated and systematic differences
in economic outcomes remain. Despite the elimination
and sometimes even reversal of the qualification
differences that often explain them, significant differences
in employment rates and relative pay remain between
men and women and between ethnic groups.
Differences in outcomes between the more and less
advantaged within each social group, however the
population is classified, are much greater than differences
between social groups. Even if all differences between
groups were removed, overall inequalities would remain
wide. The inequality growth of the last 40 years is mostly
attributable to growing gaps within groups rather than
between them.
Many of the differences examined tend to accumulate
across the lifecycle, especially those related to socio-
economic background. Economic advantage and
disadvantage reinforce themselves across the lifecycle, and
often on to the next generation. Policy interventions to
counter this are needed at each lifecycle stage. Achieving
‘equality of opportunity’ is very hard when there are such
wide differences between the resources that people and
their families have to help them fulfil their diverse
potentials.
One part of the report looks at how changes to taxes 
and benefits since 1996/7 have affected households. 
The analysis suggests that compared with unchanged
policies that involved price indexation, those who would
have been in the poorest half of the income distribution
were better off under the actual structures of 2008/9 – by
up to 25% for those who would have been in the poorest
tenth of the population. Against an earnings-linked base,
those who would have been in the poorest three tenths
were still better off on average, but to a smaller extent –
by up to 8% for the bottom tenth.
Overall, the report brings together and interprets a
sizeable body of empirical evidence, painting a picture of
key aspects of economic and social inequality over time. It
offers the kind of evidence base that policy-makers from
all political parties really need to make progress in
formulating coherent policies – policies to tackle the
negative effects that increased inequality has caused.
The report of the National Equality Panel,
An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK
(http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case/_new/publications/NEP.asp),
was published in January 2010.
CEP researchers Sandra McNally, Richard Murphy and
Jonathan Wadsworth contributed to the report along 
with CEP’s research director Stephen Machin, who is a
member of the National Equality Panel.
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W
hen a country or 
a community
discovers oil in
their subsoil or off
their coast, should
they rejoice or mourn? Should citizens be
thrilled or worried when their
governments receive fiscal windfalls? It
might seem that the answers to these
questions are obvious: how could finding
an abundance of natural resources or
stumbling on greater resources for the
government to spend in the community
be anything other than wonderful news?
Yet economists are increasingly
sceptical and many of them openly
entertain the seemingly paradoxical notion
that resources and windfalls may actually
be bad news. In fact, some go so far as to
speak of the ‘curse of natural resources’.
Before dismissing this as yet another
instance of the economics profession’s
disconnection from the real world,
consider the following list: Angola, Congo,
Nigeria, Venezuela and the Middle East.
What these places have in common is an
abundance of natural resources coupled
with varying degrees of abject poverty,
state failure and civil war, rampant
corruption and political repression.
Think also of the many anecdotes
linking foreign aid to dependency and
corruption. It is true that a few countries
seem to have managed their natural
resources fairly well – Norway is the oft-
cited example. But overall the general
impression is certainly not one of
resources being an undisguised blessing.
The problem with drawing conclusions
from comparisons of resource-rich
countries with resource-poor countries is
that many other differences can give the
appearance of a causal relation where in
fact there is none. So while it is true that
the Middle East grows (typically) slowly
and has lots of oil, the region also differs
from the rest of the world in a myriad
other social, cultural and institutional
dimensions. We cannot be certain that oil
– as opposed to one or more of these
other characteristics – is the main cause of
low growth. 
Another problem with cross-country
comparisons is that resource abundance
tends to be measured by flows of natural-
resource exports (often as a share of GDP
or total exports). But perhaps poor
countries are dependent on resource
exports because they are poor rather than
being poor because they are dependent
on resource exports. 
Our research attempts to bypass these
difficulties in interpreting cross-country
comparisons by looking at Brazilian
municipalities, which are administrative
units similar in size to the UK’s counties.
Oil endowments, and hence oil
production, vary widely across
municipalities, and we show that oil
output is not correlated (conditional on a
few geographical controls) with other
municipal characteristics.
In other words, oil-rich municipalities
differ from oil-poor municipalities only
because the former have oil and the latter
do not. This makes it possible to ask
Brazil has recently discovered huge new oilfields
off its coast – but will these natural resources be 
a blessing or a curse? Francesco Caselli and 
Guy Michaels investigate whether it has 
been the Brazilian people or their locally elected
representatives who have benefited most from
past oil windfalls.
A resource curse?
The impact of oil windfalls
on living standards in Brazil
Brazilian oil
windfalls
translate 
into little
improvement 
in public goods
provision or
people’s living
standards
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whether oil has positive or negative effects
on other market activities. Furthermore,
oil-producing municipalities are entitled to
royalties, so we can investigate the
consequences of an oil-related revenue
windfall for the local government.
We begin by investigating the effects
of oil on other market activities, and find
that these are small. In particular, if a
Brazilian municipality generates one unit
of the national currency (the real) of 
extra value added from oil, this translates
into roughly one real of extra aggregate
GDP. This indicates that, to a first
approximation, oil production has no
effects, either negative or positive, on
non-oil activities.
We do find some small changes in the
composition of non-oil GDP when the oil
Municipal revenues
from oil are being
spent – but local
communities are not
seeing the benefits
flock to oil-rich communities reinforces our
message that oil abundance has not been
viewed as particularly beneficial.
Our finding that oil windfalls translate
into little improvement in the provision of
public goods or the population’s living
standards raises a key question: where are
the oil revenues going? As a way of
addressing this question, we put together
a few pieces of tentative evidence:
 First, we find that oil revenues increase
the size of municipal workers’ houses
(but not the size of other residents’
houses).
 Second, Brazil’s news agency is more
likely to carry news items mentioning
the mayor and alleged embezzlement,
fraud or corruption in municipalities
with very high levels of oil output 
(on an absolute, though not per 
capita, basis).
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is located onshore: the
manufacturing sector shrinks
and the service sector
expands. (These effects
are probably due to
an expansion of
services to oil
operations and oil
workers.) But
offshore oil has little
impact on non-oil GDP or
on its composition.
We turn next to the revenue windfall.
We confirm that municipal revenues
increase significantly with oil production,
and that oil royalties account for the bulk
of this increase. This makes it clear that
royalty payments are not undone by
offsetting changes in other transfers from
the state or federal governments (or by tax
cuts) – in fact, they are somewhat
reinforced.
The increase in municipal revenues
arising from oil is matched by a
corresponding increase in reported
municipal expenditures. Municipalities that
receive oil windfalls report significant
increases in spending on a variety of
goods and services, such as housing and
urban infrastructure, education, health,
transport and transfers to households.
Given the significant expansion in
reported spending, we might expect
sizable improvements in living standards
for the local population. We therefore
look at measures of housing quality and
quantity, the supply of educational and
health inputs, road infrastructure and
welfare receipts.
The results paint a complex picture,
with no apparent changes in some areas,
small improvements in others and a small
worsening in yet others. On balance,
however, the data appear to suggest that
the actual flow of goods, services and
transfers to the population is not quite
commensurate with the reported spending
increases stemming from the windfall. This
shortfall we dub ‘missing money’.
To confirm that the windfall does not
trickle down to the population through
other channels, we look at household
income and find only minimal
improvements. We also show that oil-rich
municipalities did not experience a
differential increase in population. This
implies that our results are not driven by a
dilution of the benefits of oil abundance.
Furthermore, the fact that people do not
 Third, federal police operations are
more likely to occur in municipalities
with very high levels of oil output
(again in absolute terms).
 And finally, we document anecdotal
evidence of alleged scandals involving
mayors in several of the largest 
oil-producing municipalities, some 
of which also involve large sums 
of money.
How could senior municipal workers 
have thought that they could ‘get away’
with large-scale alleged theft in a country
where local elections are held regularly?
As a partial answer, we note that a survey
in the largest oil-producing municipality
found considerable ignorance among
residents about the scale of the municipal
oil windfall. 
How much can we generalise 
from our findings to other settings? 
Oil royalties
seem to be
somehow more
‘stealable’ than
other types of
revenues
revenues from oil operations directly to
local governments, at least if the officials
are not properly monitored and
accountable. For Brazil, this may be an
especially important consideration as the
system of property rights and royalties will
probably be overhauled in response to the
recent discovery of huge new offshore
oilfields.
Indeed, the issue is clearly of political
relevance, with several major federal
legislative proposals to reform the royalty
system currently pending. Interestingly,
most proposals tend to reduce both the
share of royalties going to local
governments and the discretion that these
governments have in using the revenues.
In the summer of 2009, the federal
government issued its own proposals for
the property rights regime of the newly
discovered ‘pre-salt’ giant oilfields.
More generally, our results may inform
the debate about increasing transparency
requirements both in poor, resource-
abundant countries and in countries that
receive aid. In particular, it is increasingly
common for conditionality-based
programmes to feature stringent reporting
requirements from multinational oil
companies and recipient governments.
Our results suggest that accounting
transparency per se may be insufficient.
Reporting schemes should document 
the actual effective disbursement of 
sums, and not merely their recording on
balance sheets.
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This article summarises ‘Do Oil Windfalls
Improve Living Standards? Evidence from
Brazil’ by Francesco Caselli and Guy
Michaels, CEP Discussion Paper No. 960
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0960.pdf).
Francesco Caselli is a professor of
economics at LSE and director of CEP’s
research programme on macroeconomics.
Guy Michaels is a lecturer in economics at
LSE and a research associate in CEP’s labour
markets programme.
We acknowledge that what might be 
true for Brazil need not apply to other
countries. More importantly, there are a
number of prominent explanations for the
‘resource curse’ that might only operate at
the national level.
For example, some argue that resource
abundance leads to an overvalued nominal
exchange rate, with deleterious
consequences for competitiveness.
Naturally, this cannot show up across
municipalities, which do not print their
own currencies. Similarly, our analysis
cannot test the hypothesis that resource
abundance is a cause of political violence
and civil war.
But our results do lend some credence
to the view that oil royalties are somehow
more ‘stealable’ than other types of
revenues. When we look at the usage and
effects of municipal revenues coming from
other sources, we find significant
differences relative to revenue coming
from oil, and the puzzle of ‘missing
money’ is less severe.
This may be because citizens
themselves are more tolerant of
embezzlement when the money does not
come from tax revenues. Or it may be
because they have less accurate
information on the amounts flowing to
the government in the form of oil
royalties. We cannot explore these
possibilities with our data.
But our findings do suggest that it
may be somewhat unwise to channel
Oil revenues should not 
be channelled directly to
local governments if officials
are not properly monitored
and accountable
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Well-managed firms tend to have better economic
performance and offer a more desirable work-life balance
for their employees, according to a series of recent CEP
studies. But in a world dominated by debates about
climate change and energy savings, a broader question is
whether these superior results come at the expense of the
environment.
On the one hand, better-managed firms should be able to
reduce energy use through more efficient production
techniques. On the other
hand, the higher productivity
that good management
involves may also require more
physical capital and potentially
higher energy usage. So the
relationship between
management practices and
energy intensity is, a priori,
ambiguous.
We have gathered the first
systematic evidence on how
the quality of management
relates to firms’ energy
intensity, a key driver of
greenhouse gas emissions. To
measure management
practices, we use an interview-
based evaluation tool that defines and scores from one
(‘worst practice’) to five (‘best practice) 18 basic practices.
The evaluation tool, which was developed by an
international consulting firm, scores these practices in
three broad areas.
The first is monitoring: how well do companies track what
goes on inside their firms, and use this information for
continuous improvement? The second is target-setting: do
companies set the right targets, track the right outcomes
and take appropriate action if the two don’t tally? The
third is incentives: are companies promoting and
rewarding employees based on performance, and
systematically trying to hire and keep their best
employees?
We have applied the tool to thousands of medium-sized
manufacturing firms around the world to compare
management practices and energy use across firms and
countries. The UK is particularly well suited for this
exercise as both its management score and its carbon
dioxide emissions are close to the average in our sample.
We match information on management practices in a
sample of around 300 UK manufacturing firms with new
data on energy efficiency from the Census of Production
for the establishments owned by these firms.
The results indicate that well-
managed firms are
substantially less energy-
intensive than badly managed
firms. Going from the 25th to
the 75th percentile of
management practices –
moving from ‘bad’ to ‘good’
management – is associated
with a 17.4% reduction in
energy intensity.
The reduction in energy
intensity associated with good
management is robust to a
variety of controls for industry,
location, technology and other
factor inputs. And it is large:
given that carbon dioxide emissions are growing at about
3% a year globally, a 17.4% reduction is equivalent to
about six years’ growth.
The main reason that better management reduces energy
use is that modern management systems, like Toyota’s
‘lean manufacturing system’, explicitly promote waste
reduction. One of the four buzzwords that any visitor to a
Toyota plant learns is ‘Muda’ or waste. (The others are
‘Kaizen’, continuous improvement; ‘Andon’, the cord used
to stop the line after a defect; and ‘Kanban’, the
replenishment signal system used to minimise inventories.)
Toyota employees are trained and rewarded for
continuously reducing ‘Muda’ throughout the 
factory. They do so with the aim of cutting costs and
increasing profits, rather than from any strong
Modern management: good for
the environment or just hot air?
Using CEP’s extensive survey data on management practices around the
world, Nick Bloom and colleagues examine whether well-managed firms
are more or less energy-efficient than badly managed firms.
in brief...
Going from ‘bad’ to ‘good’
management is associated
with a 17.4% reduction in
energy intensity
CentrePiece Winter 2009/10
13
environmental concern. In contrast, badly run firms are
simply not able to achieve energy efficiency. Think of the
Soviet-era factories with their terrible management
practices producing huge amounts of pollution.
So how can governments help firms to improve
management practices and reduce energy use? We have
identified several key factors that appear to play an
important role in shaping management practices – and
which can also play an important role
in reducing pollution while
delivering economic growth.
We find that product market
competition is associated with
significantly better
management practices. In
particular, the tail of badly
managed firms shrinks in
highly competitive markets.
Badly managed firms appear
to improve their management
practices or exit in competitive
markets.
Thus, the highly competitive
product markets in the United
States have led to almost no
badly managed firms left in
operation. In contrast, many product markets in Brazil,
China and India have limited competition due to entry
barriers, trade regulations and high transport costs,
enabling badly managed firms to survive. 
Multinational status also appears to play an important role
in determining firms’ management practices.
Multinationals tend to be well-run whether they are
located in Brazil, India or the United States.
In other work, we show that the affiliates of US
multinationals located in Europe are able to use their
managerial advantage to make better use of information
technology (IT) to raise productivity. We argue that
multinationals are excellent vehicles for transporting
productive and energy-efficient management practices
across countries. 
Our results suggest that policies aimed at improving
management practices – such as encouraging competition
by removing barriers to market entry, reducing trade
barriers and promoting multinational ownership – will also
improve environmental outcomes.
Improving management may provide a way both to
increase economic growth and to reduce environmental
damage. And while this particular research focuses on the
UK, the potential appears far greater in developing
countries such as Brazil, China
and India, where there is a
huge tail of badly managed –
and presumably energy-
wasteful – firms.
Improving management may
provide a way both to increase
economic growth and to reduce
environmental damage
This article summarises ‘Modern Management: Good for the
Environment or Just Hot Air?’ by Nick Bloom, Christos Genakos,
Ralf Martin and Raffaella Sadun, CEP Discussion Paper No. 891
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0891.pdf).
CEP research on management, economic performance and work-life
balance is summarised in previous issues of CentrePiece:
‘Bossonomics’ (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp293.pdf) and
‘Work-Life Balance’ (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp202.pdf).
CEP research on US firms’ use of IT is summarised in ‘It Ain’t what
You Do, It’s the Way that You Do I.T.’
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp188.pdf).
Nick Bloom is a professor of economics at Stanford University.
Christos Genakos is a lecturer in economics at Cambridge University.
Ralf Martin is a research economist at CEP. Raffaella Sadun is an
assistant professor at Harvard Business School. All are part of CEP’s
research programme on productivity and innovation.
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Immigration is currently high up
the political agenda in most
European countries as they
struggle to deal with the
increased flow of migrants that
many have experienced in recent years.
Many countries have a sizeable fraction of
the population who are hostile to
immigration, especially to immigrants from
poorer countries or those of a different
ethnicity to the majority.
In this climate, it is critically important
to understand more about how immigrants
fare – and not just the first-generation
immigrants but their children too. After all,
the longer-run effects of immigration are
probably much more influenced by how
the descendants of immigrants fare than
the immigrants themselves.
In a recent study, we compare the
experiences of first- and second-generation
immigrants in France, Germany and the UK
in terms of their education, earnings and
employment. These countries all
experienced large-scale immigration in the
1950s and 1960s so that enough time has
elapsed to be able to evaluate how the
immigrants’ children are getting on.
Although these countries have all had
sizeable immigrant populations for a
considerable time, they also differ in
important ways. First, the ethnic
composition of immigrant inflows is
different: immigrants in France and the UK
came from former colonies of those
countries, while Germany employed
immigrants from southern Europe and
Turkey.
Second, these countries have adopted
very different policies towards the
integration of immigrants. Put very crudely,
the UK has sought to accommodate and
celebrate cultural and ethnic diversity,
while France has sought to deny its
existence (at least in the public sphere) in
the interest of ‘equal treatment’. The
proposed banning of the burqa is a good
example of the latter approach.
In contrast with both these countries,
which typically granted immigrants full
citizenship, Germany did not, until
relatively recently, give citizenship to
immigrants or their children who were not
ethnically German. Long after it was clear
that they had come to stay, Germany
thought of its immigrants as only
temporary residents. 
Other European countries with more
recent immigration are considering which,
if any, of these models would be the best
one to adopt to facilitate the integration of
immigrants and their children. So it is
important to know how immigrants have
fared in France, Germany and the UK.
The central finding of our research is
that in all three countries, the labour
market performance of most immigrant
groups as well as their descendants is, on
average, worse than that of the native
population (after controlling for education,
potential experience and regional
allocation). 
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Are second-generation immigrants more
integrated into European societies than their
parents? Alan Manning and colleagues look at
evidence on economic integration for France,
Germany and the UK.
The integration of
immigrants and their
children in Europe
The labour market
performance of most
immigrant groups is
worse on average than
that of the native
population
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But our study also finds
that the gap in educational
attainment between natives
and immigrants is much reduced in the
second generation compared with the first
generation. While there is considerable
heterogeneity across immigrant groups and
the children of immigrants still do worse
than the children of native-born parents,
they often do better than their own parents.
This suggests perhaps that education
systems are working to integrate the
children of immigrants though it is much
harder to say whether progress is as fast as
it could be.
Evidence of progress in labour market
performance is not the same for all
countries and all immigrant groups. For
immigrants’ net earnings, the UK stands out
as having particularly large differences for
the first generation but also much improved
outcomes for the second generation. 
In France and Germany, differences are
not so clear-cut. The difference in male
employment rates between immigrants and
natives in Germany and the UK seem similar
for first- and second-generation immigrants,
but France has a number of groups in which
the second-generation immigrants seem to
be doing worse than the first. For women,
the patterns are similar but there is clearer
general evidence of a reduction in
employment gaps for the second
generation, especially for those immigrant
groups where female employment rates are
very low in the first generation. 
In all countries, there is considerable
heterogeneity in outcomes across immigrant
groups, and any sensible account of
immigrant disadvantage must pay attention
to the fact that immigrants cannot be
treated as an undifferentiated lump.
Does the French, German or British
model of attitudes to immigrants appear
more favoured by these findings? The
answer is that no simple link appears.
France, which until recently has been
accused of sticking its head in the sand
over the existence of poor outcomes for
immigrant groups, does not seem to have
worse outcomes than the UK, which has
had anti-discrimination legislation for over
40 years. The UK, often accused now of
paying insufficient attention to the
assimilation of immigrants, has, if
anything, the largest improvement from
the first to the second generation. 
One possible explanation for our
inability to paint a simple picture is that
government policy is much less important
than many people think. In day-to-day life
and economic activity, it is the behaviour
and aspirations of immigrants and their
children – and how they are treated by
those with whom they interact – that is
important in determining economic
outcomes.
By a stroke of a pen, governments
may be able to pass anti-discrimination
legislation or prevent Muslim schoolgirls
wearing the hijab. But it is much harder to
change attitudes – and it is these attitudes
that ultimately determine outcomes. 
This article summarises ‘The Economic
Situation of First- and Second-generation
Immigrants in France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom’ by Yann Algan,
Christian Dustmann, Albrecht Glitz and 
Alan Manning, which is published in the
February 2010 issue of the Economic Journal
(http://www.res.org.uk/economic/ejtoc.asp?
ref=0013-0133&vid=120&iid=542&oc=0).
An earlier version is available as CEP
Discussion Paper No. 951
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0951.pdf).
Yann Algan is at Sciences Po in Paris.
Christian Dustmann is director of the Centre
for Research and Analysis on Migration at
University College London. Albrecht Glitz is
at Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Alan Manning
is professor of economics at LSE and 
director of CEP’s research programme on
labour markets.
The children of
immigrants do
worse than the
children of
native-born
parents – but
they often do
better than their
own parents
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T
he performance of
hospitals within the
National Health Service
(NHS) varies considerably.
This is true irrespective of
the measure used: mortality rates, waiting
times, patient satisfaction and other
indicators all show a wide spread of
performance between hospitals.
The variation in performance parallels
other parts of the economy, where there
are astounding differences in productivity
across firms and plants, even within
narrowly defined sectors. There has long
been speculation that management
practices might play a role in explaining
this dispersion, a view confirmed by a
series of recent CEP studies.
Might the same be true for the
performance of NHS hospitals? In a new
study, we apply to hospitals a modified
version of the methodology for measuring
management practices that we have used
successfully in the manufacturing and
retail sectors.
We interviewed doctors and managers
in orthopaedics and cardiology in acute
hospitals (those intended for short-term
medical and/or surgical treatment and
care) in England, using an evaluation tool
that defines and scores 18 different
management practices from one (‘worst
practice’) to five (‘best practice’). We
developed this survey through discussion
with management and healthcare experts
and we score management practices
within three broadly defined areas:
 Monitoring: how well do hospitals
track the steps along a patient’s path
through the NHS system, and do they
use this information for continuous
improvement?
 People: do hospitals actively promote
and reward their employees based 
on performance? Are staff doing the
roles they are best trained to perform?
Is there a systematic process of hiring
and keeping the best people? 
Are under-performers retrained or
moved to a different role where they
can perform better?
How well are NHS hospitals managed – and what
could be done to improve this? CEP researchers
have conducted a unique survey of clinicians 
and hospital managers to address these questions,
and to explore the impact of competition on
management practices in the NHS.
Management 
practices 
in the NHS
Better
management 
is strongly
correlated with
better hospital
performance
measured by
both clinical
and financial
outcomes
Management practices and
hospital performance
In our first analysis of the data, we look at
whether our measure of management
quality is correlated with standard
measures of hospital performance.
Hospitals with higher management scores
have better clinical outcomes (for example,
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Note: We divide the Healthcare Commission’s average score into
quintiles from lowest score (1) to highest score (5). We show the
average management score (over all 18 questions) in each of the
quintiles. The hospitals with higher Healthcare Commission
ratings have higher management scores.
Figure 1:
Healthcare Commission
ratings are higher in
hospitals with higher
quality management
 Target setting: do hospitals set 
the right targets and track the right
outcomes? Do they take appropriate
action if targets are not met?
To obtain accurate responses from
hospitals, we interviewed managers and
clinicians using a ‘double-blind’
technique. Interviewees were not told in
advance that they were being scored, nor
were they shown the scoring grid.
Similarly, to avoid prejudice, the
interviewers were not given information
on hospital quality.
To run this blind scoring, we used
open questions. For example, the first
incentives question was ‘How does your
appraisal system work? Tell me about
your most recent round’, rather than
closed questions such as ‘Do you promote
high performers [yes/no]?’ 
We obtained a high response rate –
61% of all acute hospitals in England –
interviewing a total of 161 clinicians and
managers.
lower mortality rates from emergency
heart attacks), shorter waiting times,
better financial performance and higher
staff satisfaction.
For example, we find that a one
standard deviation improvement in
management is associated with a fall in the
death rate from heart attacks from 17% to
16%. Such an improvement would result
in around 400 fewer deaths a year in our
sample from this condition alone.
Another general indicator of hospital
performance is the overall rating from the
Healthcare Commission (the former
regulator of the sector, now replaced by
the Care Quality Commission), which, as
Figure 1 shows, clearly rises with better
management practices.
Although we cannot be sure that
these are causal effects, the strength of
the correlation is suggestive of important
effects of management practices on
hospital performance. 
At the very least, these
findings indicate that the
answers to the interview
questions are not just 
‘hot air’.
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A one standard
deviation improvement
in management is
associated with 
400 fewer deaths from
heart attacks a year in
the surveyed hospitals
hospitals where senior managers have
some clinical training. This makes sense as
such managers are better able to
understand, communicate with and
challenge powerful senior doctors.
Drawing more senior managers from
clinical ranks, as is done in the United
States, would be a good policy move.
We also investigate the impact of
competition on hospital management.
There have been many policy reforms in
recent years to increase patient choice
between hospitals and create more
effective competition. And one of the
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Note: This is the distribution of the average management score by hospital from 
1 (=worst practice) to 5 (=best practice). The management scores are based on 161 
interviews of NHS managers and clinicians in 100 English acute hospitals.
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Comparing management
practices in the NHS
We find that there is large variation in
management practices between hospitals,
as Figure 2 shows, a phenomenon also
observed in other sectors of the economy. 
Although comparing across sectors is
fraught with difficulty, we find that the
average management scores in NHS
hospitals look lower than in the private
sector (manufacturing, retail and private
hospitals). The main difference lies in
people management, with the NHS 
doing particularly badly in this dimension. 
Competition and
management practices
With management scores varying
dramatically across hospitals, which factors
lead to better management practices? 
Several interesting findings emerge
from our research. For example,
management appears to be better in
strongest findings from our work on the
manufacturing sector is that competition
stimulates better management and 
higher productivity.
In healthcare, competition is based on
geography – hospitals tend to compete
with other local hospitals. We find that
hospitals with many other hospitals 
nearby tend to have significantly better
management practices. 
But how do we know that it is really
the number of rival hospitals driving up
management quality rather than some
other factor? For example, a larger share
of elderly people in a particular part of 
the country will increase demand for
hospital services. This will increase the
number of hospitals without necessarily
increasing competitiveness.
We try to control for as many of these
factors as possible. We know, for example,
the characteristics of patients coming to
the hospital, the healthiness of the local
area and so on. But of course there may
always be something we miss. To deal with
this problem, we use the fact that the
number of hospitals in an area has a large
political component. In particular, the
closure of a hospital is usually highly
contentious. We show that, all else 
equal, hospitals located in marginal
constituencies are much less likely to be
closed than hospitals in safe seats.
Thus, the political structure of
constituency boundaries becomes a
‘natural experiment’, which we can use to
compare some areas with more hospitals
(where political competition is fierce and
no one wants to be blamed for hospital
closure) and other near-identical areas
with fewer hospitals (where there is little
political competition).
Using this experimental approach only
strengthens our conclusion that
competition has a large effect in
improving managerial quality in hospitals.
Figure 2:
Management scores 
in NHS hospitals
Just as in the
manufacturing
sector, there is
large variation in
management
practices between
hospitals
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This article summarises a forthcoming CEP
Discussion Paper: ‘The Impact of Competition
on Management Practices in Public Hospitals’
by Nick Bloom, Carol Propper, Stephan Seiler
and John Van Reenen.
The research on management in
manufacturing is detailed in: ‘Measuring 
and Explaining Management Practices 
across Firms and Countries’ by Nick Bloom
and John Van Reenen, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 122(4): 1351-1408 (earlier version
available as CEP Discussion Paper No. 716:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0716.pdf). More recent work is in the 
latest issue of the Journal of Economic
Perspectives.
Nick Bloom is a professor of economics at
Stanford University and a research associate
in CEP’s productivity and innovation
programme. Carol Propper is at the Centre
for Market and Public Organisation at the
University of Bristol and the Healthcare
Management Group at Imperial College
London. Stephan Seiler is an occasional
research assistant in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme. John Van Reenen is
director of CEP.
We asked our interviewers to note some of the most
surprising comments they hear. This quote was horrifyingly
illustrative of the badly managed hospital it came from:
Interviewer:
‘Do staff sometimes end up doing the wrong sort of 
work for their skills?’
NHS mxanager:
‘You mean like doctors doing nurses’ jobs, and nurses 
doing porter jobs? Yeah, all the time. Last week, we had 
to get the healthier patients to push around the beds 
for the sicker patients.’
Future directions 
for research
With the data available to us so far, 
we have established that competition
improves the quality of hospital
management. But how does it have 
this effect?
One possibility is that the channel
works simply through product market
competition: as recent reforms have tried
to implement a ‘quasi-market’ for
healthcare services, hospitals now have an
incentive to provide better care to attract
patients. In a more competitive
environment, hospitals will therefore have
a stronger incentive to improve the quality
of their management practices.
Even in a regulated environment,
where monitoring agencies and regulators
decide how well a hospital is performing,
the number of hospitals will have an
impact. In an area with many hospitals, 
it is easier to assess the performance 
of each hospital by comparing it with 
its neighbours. 
Finally, a more competitive
environment might provide a more
attractive labour market for high-quality
managers. With more hospitals nearby, it
is easier for managers to look out for
better employment opportunities.
But whatever the exact mechanism,
having more local rivals does appear to
have advantages for management and
patient care.
Management seems to be
better in hospitals where
managers have some 
clinical training
Hospitals faced
with a larger
number of
nearby
competing
hospitals have
much better
management
practices
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In Sweden, reforms enacted in the early 1990s allowed
new schools to be set up that are independent of
government control. A variety of educational providers
stepped in, ranging from non-profit co-operatives and
faith groups to for-profit corporations. These organisations
are now running schools funded with public money
through a voucher system.
The Swedish system has been strongly praised by
Conservative politicians, whose ‘Advancing Opportunity’
agenda proposes ‘freeing up the system whereby new
schools are established, to allow charities, livery
companies, existing school federations, not-for-profit
trusts, co-operatives and groups of parents to set up new
schools in the state sector’. It has been suggested that an
extended and reformed academies programme (initially
introduced by the Blair government) would be the way to
implement this approach in the UK.
For some years, school choice and competition have been
advocated as a mechanism for improving educational
standards. It is argued that schools in the public sector
might lack the right incentives to provide the best possible
education, and the idea is that competition should put
pressure on these schools to improve. But the evidence on
this is mixed, and the most detailed
study for England, carried out at CEP,
finds no effect of choice and
competition on primary school
performance (Gibbons et al, 2008).
There have been a number of studies of
the effects of the Swedish reform. The
most recent and careful study is by
Anders Bohlmark and Mikael Lindahl
(2008), who find evidence of only small
positive effects. They speculate that one reason
for this could be the fact that the entry of new
private schools has not been followed by the closing
down of state schools. It may be that increasing shares
of school budgets have been devoted to the maintenance
of poor quality state schools.
This points to a general weakness in the application of
market economics to the public sector. There is no natural
mechanism for closing down poor schools (they do not
literally go bust). Closing down schools can be slow,
political and unpopular. The reality that governments will
have to support simultaneously the new schools and the
older ‘bad’ ones, and that the latter will not exit at an
efficient rate, needs to be factored into the expected cost-
effectiveness of a ‘school creation’ policy.
Creating new schools can also be an expensive 
policy if large capital outlays are required. This is the 
case with academies in the UK, although not for the 
new independent schools in Sweden. The latter are 
usually small and often use empty office buildings or
former schools. This raises several big questions for all
political parties.
A Swedish model 
for UK schools?
Educational reforms in Sweden have been held up as a potential model
for improving the performance of UK schools. Helena Holmlund and
Sandra McNally examine the evidence.
in brief...
Importing the Swedish
model may not make
very much difference
to the UK’s educational
status quo
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In a climate of tight public expenditure, is capital spending
really the most efficient use of funds? What about all the
evidence on other things that work to improve
educational performance, such as teacher quality, reducing
class size, etc? And what about recent research that
evaluates the academies programme? Stephen Machin
and Joan Wilson (2009) find evidence that new 
academies have not performed very much better than
other similar schools.
Of course, not everything is about money. The main
reason why the Swedish model is praised is because 
the schools are free from political control. But this is only
true up to a point. For example, the new Swedish schools
have to follow the national curriculum. This is not the case
for academy schools in the UK, where it is only a
requirement for English, maths, science and information
and communications technology. The sponsor also
chooses the subject specialism (since all academy schools
are ‘specialist’).
Although, as in Sweden, state schools are not allowed to
select pupils by ability, specialist schools are allowed to
select 10% of pupils by ‘aptitude’ in their specialist
subject. In practical terms, how does a school select by
aptitude and not by ability? Is it right that sponsors should
have so much power in deciding how pupils are taught?
How can other aspects of policy be imposed (synthetic
phonics, for example) while allowing independence from
political control?
It is not at all clear in principle or practice how far the
provision of education can or should be independent from
the political process. This is partly a question of empirical
research. If ‘autonomy’ is shown to be a good feature of
aspects of school governance, then why not extend this
privilege to all schools? This is not an argument for brand
new schools.
Furthermore, importing the Swedish model may not make
very much difference to the UK’s educational status quo.
In the early 1990s, Sweden started from a position of no
school choice: all pupils had to attend the state school in
their neighbourhood. In the UK, however, there is already
much school choice and a diversity of provision. 
The problem – as research at CEP has shown - is that not
all people in the UK are empowered to exercise choice
because they do not have the money to move to an area
with popular schools or the personal resources to access
and understand information about school quality. Therein
lies another challenge.
Further reading
Anders Bohlmark and Mikael Lindahl (2008) ‘Does 
School Privatisation Improve Educational Achievement?
Evidence from Sweden’s Voucher Reform’, IZA Discussion
Paper No. 3691.
Stephen Gibbons, Stephen Machin and Olmo Silva (2008)
‘Choice, Competition and Pupil Achievement’, Journal of the
European Economic Association 6(4): 912-47.
Stephen Machin and Joan Wilson (2009) ‘Academy Schools 
and Pupil Performance’, CentrePiece, Spring 2009
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp280.pdf).
Creating new schools
will be expensive if
large capital outlays
are required and
‘bad’ existing schools
remain open
Helena Holmlund is a research fellow at the Swedish Institute
for Social Research, Stockholm University, and a research
associate in CEP’s education and skills programme. Sandra
McNally is director of CEP’s education and skills programme.
Violence in Iraq:
the impact of public 
debate during wartime
CentrePiece Winter 2009/10
Does public debate about the pros and cons of the
UK’s involvement in Iraq undermine the chances of
military success? Radha Iyengar examines the
incentives of Iraqi insurgent groups to commit acts of
violence, their responses to public opinion in the
West, and the lessons for both communications
policy and counter-insurgency strategy.
T
he Chilcot inquiry into the
UK’s involvement in Iraq
between 2001 and 2009
is unique in its breadth of
coverage: from the
evidence available in the public domain for
entering the conflict and the subsequent
military action to the political and social
aftermath, both in Iraq and at home. 
A central question is whether information
to justify the UK’s involvement was
withheld or presented to the public in a
misleading way.
Of potentially equal significance is the
fact that the Iraq inquiry is available live
via the internet and satellite television. 
A concern commonly cited across many
similar conflicts is the extent to which such
open debate in democracies can reduce
the chances of a successful military
outcome. Is it possible that public debate
over the progress and plans for war may
be sending information to opponents in
conflict areas that may undermine the
chances of military success by damaging
the credibility of a nation’s long-term
commitment to persist until victory? 
This concern is amplified in insurgent
conflicts, in which guerrilla tactics are used
to try to overthrow an incumbent
government. Studies by conflict experts
James Fearon and David Laitin have shown
that insurgent groups operate using
political as well as military techniques.
These seek to ‘delegitimise’ the existing
government. This is typically accomplished
through the use of violence, which makes
it difficult for existing political parties to
govern effectively and maintain public
support (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).
Such insurgencies tend to result in
protracted conflicts with neither insurgent
nor counter-insurgent forces achieving a
decisive victory. As Eisenstadt and White
(2005) show, the average duration of
insurgencies in the twentieth century is
approximately nine years, with about half
resulting in success for the government.
This gives time for insurgent forces to
disseminate alternative political scenarios
and win over the civilian population whose
government they are attempting 
to overturn.
Concerns about domestic debate
hindering military success are particularly
relevant to insurgent conflict in Iraq 
(and now, of course, in Afghanistan) for
two reasons:
 First, public debate may create the
perception that the UK and its allies
appear responsive to attacks by
insurgents. Changing strategy in
response to insurgent violence may
increase the perceived benefits to that
action. This may increase the willingness
of insurgents to engage in greater levels
of violence, endangering both civilians
and military personnel.
 Second, individual Iraqis, and
particularly those as yet uncommitted to
either side in a conflict, may be less
likely to collaborate with the UK or its
allies by providing information if pro-
government forces cannot credibly
protect them from retribution by
insurgent groups. 
Incentives for insurgents
To think about these issues systematically, it
is useful to consider insurgent groups in
Iraq as strategic actors who respond to
incentives created by the policies of the
coalition and the emergent Iraqi national
government. That makes it possible to
discuss how information on the counter-
insurgent forces’ commitment affects their
perceived costs and benefits. 
By all definitions, the UK and its allies
have faced a devastating insurgency in Iraq
since overthrowing the previous regime in
mid-2003. Although the major conflict
phase of military operations lasted until 1
May 2003, substantial military forces
remain engaged in low-level conflict. Until
very recently, the UK and its allies remained
largely responsible for maintaining Iraq’s
internal and external security. Figure 1
shows the trends in violence in Iraq
between 2003 and 2008. 
It is in this context that the Iraqi
insurgency steadily grew in size and
capability from 2003 onwards. Unlike
nationalist or secessionist insurgencies that
are initiated and led by a single, unified
group, the insurgency in Iraq that emerged
after the invasion and occupation of Iraq
was fractionalised between the separate
ethnic and religious communities that
make up Iraq’s population.
The result has been organisations and
networks that are local and decentralised,
small in scale and with loose or non-
existent ties between them. This lack of
centralisation of the insurgency in Iraq
bears directly on the effect of new
information on violence. In a centralised
insurgency, two types of action may be
predicted:
 First, insurgent groups may decide
whether to wait out the occupying
forces by restraining violence until they
withdraw.
 Second, insurgent groups may increase
the scale of violence in an attempt to
induce withdrawal. The option to
attack involves a decision of not only
how much to attack but also where
attacks might be most strategically
advantageous.
In contrast, the strategy of reducing
violence levels and waiting it out is not an
option available to competing insurgent
groups, which must situate themselves not
only relative to the occupying forces but
also relative to other insurgent groups.
This is because insurgent groups are
competing among themselves to maximise
their power and influence over the state
and society. They may use violence and
terrorism not only to impose costs on the
occupying force, but also as a tactic to
establish dominance over competing
groups.
In short, in a competing insurgency,
the various groups compete for relative
position using violence as their major tool.
This results in a complex and selective
pattern of violence in contrast to
centralised insurgencies. 
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Note: The number of attacks per province-week is defined as non-criminal acts that result in
the death of one or more persons. The data do not distinguish between Sunni insurgent
attacks and Shia militia attacks. Attacks that result in only injuries are not included.
Figure 1:
Trends in attacks and fatalities after the invasion of Iraq
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Insurgents use
violence not only
to impose costs on
the occupying
force, but also as a
tactic to establish
dominance
between
competing groups
The impact of information
on violence
We can now start to consider the role of
information, as provided by public debate,
on violence levels in the conflict. To do
this, we can consider the objectives of the
groups and the role that violence plays in
achieving those objectives, and then
consider how information affects the
perceived rewards to violent actions.
A commonly suggested objective for a
group in a decentralised insurgency is to
maximise their influence as the influence
of the occupying force declines or
withdraws completely. 
Under conditions where some groups
have information about the potential
actions of the occupying force and others
do not, changes in behaviour might be
expected of the groups that have
information. This is more likely to be the
case with information relevant to whether
the counter-insurgent forces’ commitment
is changing. Here are two hypothetical
cases of how this might work:
 First, suppose the occupying force is
unambiguously dominant. Then, there
are smaller returns to being in any
insurgent group, as the chance of the
insurgency winning power is very low.
Similarly, there is less incentive to
compete over relative position between
insurgent groups, as the relative gain
of being the top versus the second-best
insurgent group is also small.
 Second, suppose the occupying force
is believed to have declining or lower
levels of influence. The chances of
influencing the civilian population and
having meaningful political power for
any insurgent group are higher than in
the first case, especially where
government counter-insurgency
operations are weaker. So here, each
insurgent group also has a larger
incentive to strengthen their position
relative to the other insurgent groups.
In this framework, attacks in Iraq targeted
at the coalition military offer an opportunity
for insurgent groups to demonstrate both
absolute strength vis-à-vis a foreign
occupier and relative strength with respect
to other insurgent groups, and to increase
the costs of continued military involvement.
Attacks targeted at civilian settings establish
relative strength too, but they also impose
costs on civilians themselves.
The trade-off that insurgents face is
the greater ease but lower return of
civilian attacks versus the greater cost (and
risk) but higher return of military attacks.
In a competitive framework where
insurgents seek to win the support of the
population, such civilian attacks may
become increasingly costly and military
attacks increasingly desirable as the
returns to establishing absolute
dominance increase.
This theory generates two testable
empirical implications:
 First, insurgent-initiated attacks should
differ depending on the locally
available information about potential
future coalition behaviour. If there are
spatially different responses to
information, this implies a
geographically decentralised insurgency
in Iraq with between-group
competition.
 Second, insurgent-initiated attacks
should increase with respect to military
targets and decrease with respect to
civilian targets. This is because the
value of civilian and military targets is
different. 
If there is a shift in targeting, this may
imply competition between groups in the
insurgency. This assertion is premised on
the theory that new information about
coalition involvement may change
insurgent groups’ incentives. The
individual insurgent groups are motivated
to impose greater damages on military
targets to try to achieve dominance. Think
of this as similar to a situation in which
multiple interest groups or political parties
vie for influence or share of the vote.
Conflict in the age of high-
speed communications
Generally, the response of insurgent
behaviour has been difficult to verify
empirically because information on public
support for war or dissatisfaction with the
military’s performance was difficult to
obtain by insurgent groups on the ground.
In the last decade, however, information
technologies have dramatically changed
that, enabling remote regions of the world
to have near real-time access to
information.
The conflict in Iraq represents the first
major military engagement in which high
speed international communications, such
as satellite television, have been broadly
and commercially available, making real-
time information available to all. The sale
of satellite dishes in Iraq ‘skyrocketed in
shows, this difference dissipates by the
fourth week. 
These two independent findings are
consistent with the original hypothesis
that in a decentralised insurgency,
individual insurgent groups act in a
competitive manner both to gain
dominance among groups and to increase
local public support. Supporting the latter
conclusion is my finding that attacks
following poll releases shift from civilian
targets and towards military targets.
Public debate in 
democratic societies
Before considering recommendations for
policy based on these findings, it is
important to note that the results do not
represent a full analysis of the costs and
benefits of an open public debate about
military strategy. My study does not
address the issue of whether criticism of
war strategies brings sufficient extra
benefits to society to make such costs
acceptable.
Extensive empirical research suggests
that open debate, independent scrutiny of
official policy and transparency improves
the quality of decisions in democracies
relative to closed political systems and may
at times be necessary to force changes in
war strategy (Kaufman, 2004; Snyder,
1991). Public criticism and policy reviews
may therefore be beneficial overall if the
resulting improvements in strategy
produce a real reduction in attacks 
and fatalities.
But in democratic societies where
public debate cannot, and should not, be
limited, it is important to recognise the
important role that information plays in
affecting the behaviour of insurgent
groups. It is also important to recognise
that the concept of ‘domestic’ debate that
remains unavailable to other non-domestic
participants in a conflict no longer exists.
Debates on military strategy and public
opinion are now internationally available.
While they can and should occur, it is
important to recognise that they will also
be available to insurgent groups – and
that discussion should therefore be
responsibly managed by media
organisations.
An important consideration may be
the type of coverage, be it print, broadcast
or satellite. Information available on the
internet and via satellite has much broader
and more rapid international diffusion
than traditional broadcast television or print
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the months following the invasion, 
leading to one of the highest penetration
rates in the world in just two years’
(Cochrane, 2006). 
Nevertheless, ‘while nearly all (93%)
Iraqis report owning a television, only
about a third (33%) have access to a
satellite dish’, according to a media poll by
the UK’s Office of Intelligence and
Research. Access varied dramatically by
regions, largely based on pre-war
infrastructure and regional weather
conditions, and I have exploited such
variations to test the relationship between
access to news about US politics across
Iraq’s 18 provinces and patterns of
insurgent violence.
Specifically, I combine data on US
military and Iraqi civilian fatalities resulting
from insurgent violence, the release of
polls on US public opinion towards the Iraq
war and access to satellite television media
in Iraq. 
With the assumption that provinces
with greater access to satellite television
have greater and more rapid exposure to
US news, I investigate whether insurgent
groups in these areas responded
differentially following the release of US
public opinion polls. I use a technique that
makes it possible to control for many other
variables between the provinces and over
time.
Tracking the responses to polls released
over a two-year period, I find that the
frequency of attacks increased by between
5% and 15% in high satellite areas
compared with low satellite areas in the
two weeks following the release of new
public opinion polls in the United States.
The analysis also shows that the
number of military fatalities increased by
between 40% and 50% in the weeks
following poll releases, while the number
of Iraqi civilian casualties decreased by
between 20% and 30%. As Figure 2
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Figure 2:
Difference in attacks after poll information is 
released on satellite television
Note: The number of attacks per province-week is defined as non-criminal acts that result in
the death of one or more persons. The data do not distinguish between Sunni insurgent
attacks and Shia militia attacks. Attacks that result in only injuries are not included.
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There is also supporting evidence for this
in the context of political violence from
Israeli penalties for Palestinian suicide
bombers. Recent work suggests that
house demolitions reduce suicide attacks
(Benmelech et al, 2009). This suggests
that even apparently extreme forms of
political violence may be somewhat open
to deterrence. 
In addition, these results help to
identify which strategies are likely to be
unsuccessful. For example, if insurgent
groups are decentralised, then counter-
insurgent strategies based on identifying
and incapacitating a single command-and-
control operation will be ineffective.
Instead, approaches need to parallel
policing strategies. Targeting lower level
operatives and exposing individual groups
requires increased patrols, community
participation and even negotiated deals
with former insurgents. Programmes such
as the Sons of Iraq follow this line of
reasoning and have been largely thought
to be effective (though no formal
evaluations have been undertaken). 
Even if counter-insurgency strategy
overall does not change, military
strategists should now consider the
returns to various operations,
understanding the role that competition
between groups plays in generating
violence.
Radha Iyengar is an assistant professor of
economics at LSE and a research associate in
CEP’s labour markets and productivity and
innovation programmes.
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Attacks following
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opinion polls
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and towards
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media. Media companies may wish to
consider what information to include in
which communication form.
Strategies to reduce 
insurgent violence
Any conclusions for military strategy should
be taken with a cautionary note. Given the
complex nature of insurgencies and the
limited empirical information available,
further research is needed to identify more
precisely the channels through which
various counter-insurgent activities affect
insurgent behaviour. With this caveat, I
suggest that the following
recommendations arise from the existing
evidence.
If a short-term change in information
changes the strategy of competing
insurgent groups, then it may be possible
to use both outgoing information and
competition between groups to combat
violent insurgent activity more effectively.
Strategies may be used to take advantage
of inter-group rivalry and the need to
compete for public support. The following
strategies could be tried: 
 Providing rewards for cooperation with
counter-insurgency operations: there is
some supporting empirical evidence for
this approach in Iraq from recent
empirical work (Berman et al, 2008). In
Iraq, government and coalition provision
of public services, such as schools and
hospitals, are associated with lower
levels of violence. 
 Increasing penalties for cooperation with
any insurgent group: while there are
often harsh penalties for cooperation,
there is not a well-defined set of
penalties for different levels of
cooperation. My research in the context
of US crime, as well as previous research
on the economics of deterrence,
suggests that such penalties are critical
to reducing participation (Iyengar, 2008).
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Previous recessions show that the main danger is the
build-up of long-term unemployment. Once people are
long-term unemployed, they become increasingly difficult
to place back into work. So the build-up of long-term
unemployment makes it difficult to have a quick recovery
that is not also inflationary.
One significant new policy that could make a big
contribution here would be the introduction of a ‘job
guarantee’. This would be a system of placements in
temporary jobs, created and paid for by the government.
The ‘activation’ approach to unemployment – in which
after some point it becomes impossible to receive support
except through activity – has been shown to be effective
in reducing overall unemployment.
A job guarantee could help prevent negative attitudes to
the job search process, and avoid an increase in misery
among people suffering from inactivity. Common
humanity requires us to offer meaningful activity
when the regular economy does not. We must
make it clear that, whatever happens, there
will be a job within a reasonable period.
We should build on the New Deal for
Young People and on the Flexible
New Deal by introducing a
guaranteed job for six months
after 12 months unemployment for 18-25 year olds, and
after 18 months for those over 25. The whole aim is to
get people off benefits and into regular jobs. Only if this
fails would we provide fallback jobs through the job
guarantee.
Jobs created under the job guarantee must meet two
important criteria:
 They must of course be useful. Possible areas of work
could include maintenance for public housing, schools,
hospitals and roads, or social care activities, such as
home help. The work needs to be managed
Job guarantee: a new promise 
on long-term unemployment
The UK needs a ‘job guarantee’ for jobseekers who have been
out of work for 12 months. According to CEP’s founder director
Richard Layard, such a measure would prevent long-term
unemployment worsening after the recession ends.
in brief...
Common humanity
requires us to offer
meaningful activity 
when the regular
economy 
does not
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professionally with a visible leader at the centre, and
continued job search should be encouraged.
 Workers must be paid the rate for the job. This is
essential for credibility. If the worker were paid
benefit-plus, the image would be one of workfare:
‘You are only entitled to your dole money if you work
for it’. If the job were waged, the image would be:
‘You are now entitled to a job and you get paid for it’.
Based on experience in the early 1990s, we could expect
the scheme to apply to roughly 250,000 people aged 
18-25 (unemployed for 12 months) and 350,000 people
over 25 (unemployed for 18 months).
Assuming the job guarantee job is 30 hours a week at
the minimum wage, the cost for six months is £4,500
(also assuming no one who starts a guaranteed job leaves
within the six months, which would reduce costs).
Adding in the cost of supervision and materials brings the
gross cost to the Exchequer to around £7,000 per person.
Of course, during the same time the person would have
mainly been on benefits (though on average I assume
four months, since some would find work). The savings
from keeping someone off Jobseekers’ Allowance for
four months, coupled with the increase in taxes paid per
worker, amount to £2,300 per person (with another
£1,500 from younger people not being on the Flexible
New Deal), giving a net cost for the scheme of roughly
£2.45 billion each year.
The benefits to society from this measure are much
greater than the Exchequer costs. They include:
 The output produced by these jobs.
 The greater personal wellbeing of people otherwise
unemployed, through providing hope at a time of
potential despair.
 Improved job search prospects and future work skills.
 The prevention of persistent long-term unemployment.
 A significant boost in general reflation, through
spending by people with a high marginal propensity 
to consume.
These proposals were put forward to the government by
Paul Gregg and myself in March 2009. The part relating
to young people is now being implemented through the
Future Jobs Fund. But people over 25 matter too. The
misery caused by unemployment is no respecter of age –
and long-term unemployment when over 25 has a
permanent ‘scarring’ effect on a person’s happiness and
income prospects. 
So all political parties should support introducing a 
job guarantee for adults over 25 within at least 18
months of them becoming unemployed. There is work
that needs to be done and people wanting to do it – 
let’s bring them together. A crisis is a good moment to 
do this. But it should be a permanent feature of our
labour market policy.
Professor Lord Richard Layard is director of CEP’s
research programme on wellbeing. Paul Gregg is a
professor of economics at the University of Bristol
and a senior research fellow in CEP’s labour
markets programme.
Jobs created under the
scheme must be useful
and workers must be
paid the rate for the job
There is work that needs to be
done and people wanting to do it
– let’s bring them together
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